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As the title of this chapter suggests, three major developments characterize the contemporary 
history of Dutch water management: the environmental 
wave, the renewed attention for flood safety strategies, 
and the Europeanization of Dutch water policies. The 
first development concerns the lasting influence of both 
the environmental wave and the democratization of 
Dutch society in the 1960s and 1970s on Dutch water 
policies. As the increased environmental awareness 
induced a substantive change of water policies toward 
integrated water resources management based on a 
water systems approach, the democratization process 
in Dutch society would have an impact on the process 
of decision making on new water policies and proj-
ects. Top-down, expert-driven decision making was 
replaced, at least in part, by more interactive and delib-
erative modes of governance.
The second important development was renewed 
attention to flood policies and strategies in the face of 
climate change. Following the floods of the Rhine and 
Meuse rivers in 1993 and 1995, flood safety received a 
high place on the political agenda again. Traditional 
flood policies aimed at reducing flood probability 
by the construction of dikes were reconsidered, and 
new “room for the river” policies were introduced. 
Furthermore, these latest flood policies were no longer 
confined to reducing flood probability, but also aimed 
at reducing flood exposure and flood vulnerability—
strategies that the Dutch seem to have unlearned over 
the past century. To inform the public on these policy 
changes, the Dutch government at century’s end 
launched a large-scale public campaign, informing 
the people that they have to learn “to live with water” 
again.1 These new flood management strategies of 
creating room for the river and raising water awareness, 
however, have not replaced the policies of reducing 
flood probability by the construction of dikes. Rather, 
these policies were placed alongside existing ones and 
by that have broadened the arsenal of flood manage-
ment strategies the Dutch government is now using. A 
new Delta Commission advised the Dutch government 
on flood protection policy for the longer term (up to 
2200). This commission, which issued its findings in 
2008, emphasized the need for increasing flood safety 
standards in the long term. Its advice is now being elab-
orated on through the Delta Program.
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The third major trend relevant to understanding 
recent developments in Dutch water resources 
management is the ongoing Europeanization of water 
policies. The European water regime has developed 
over the past decades and almost any aspect of water 
management, whether it is groundwater, surface water, 
water quality, or flood management, is now covered by 
European directives and policies. Very similar to the 
development in many other policy sectors, Europe has 
become a fourth and powerful administrative tier in 
Dutch water management. 
Nineteen ninety-eight represented a milestone in 
the history of the Rijkswaterstaat as it celebrated its 
200th anniversary in presence of Queen Beatrix.2 Accom-
panying the celebration was the publication of Two 
Centuries Rijkswaterstaat, (Twee eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat 
in Dutch), an overview of 200 years of technological 
expertise and societal dynamics.3 It shows the strong 
interrelationship of the Rijkswaterstaat with society, 
which continues to present. The Delft University of 
Technology (TU Delft) organized a symposium and 
presented to the Rijkswaterstaat the book Water Magi-
cians, Delfts’ Ideas for Another 200 years Rijkswaterstaat 
(Water tovenaars, Delftse ideeën voor nog 200 jaar Rijks-
waterstaat).4 As all faculties of the TU Delft have rela-
tions with the Rijkswaterstaat, every faculty contributed 
one or more chapters. The director-general of the Rijks-
waterstaat, Gerrit Blom, received an honorary degree 
from TU Delft in recognition of his activities in the field 
of pollution reduction and the large-scale reorganiza-
tion of the Rijkswaterstaat. To underscore its interna-
tional ties, the Rijkswaterstaat organized the interna-
tional conference “Sustainable development of deltas” 
in Amsterdam in November 1998.5
In the 1970s and 1980s a cultural change occurred 
within the Rijkswaterstaat—increasingly, it could be 
characterized as a multi-disciplinary organization. These 
changes were particularly a result of the explosive rise of 
societal demands for solving environmental issues as well 
as the democratization within society with more attention 
for societal demands, openness, and transparency. In the 
1980s and 1990s the neoliberal ideology and politics also 
influenced the organizational culture of the Rijkswater-
staat.6 In addition to engineering practice, more attention 
was given to output steering, performance measurement, 
and public-private partnerships (as discussed below in 
the section titled “The Environmental Era”). 
Concerning the national water policy, a funda-
mental change occurred in 2002. Up to that date, the 
national policy on water affairs, and particularly flood 
defense, was developed at the Head Office for Water at 
the Rijkswaterstaat. This also included responsibility 
for international water affairs, so to that date the Rijks-
waterstaat represented the Netherlands in international 
water forums. On January 28, 2002, the Water Directorate 
at the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management (now called the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment) was created and took the leading 
role in the decision-making process. The Rijkswaterstaat 
remained a part of the ministry and is responsible for the 
design, construction, management, and maintenance 
of the main infrastructure facilities in the Netherlands, 
including the network of main roads, the network 
of main waterways, and the main water systems. As 
outlined in the sections on “Renewed Concern for Safety” 
and “Europeanization of Water Politics,” the Rijkswater-
staat played the leading role until 2002, and after that 
this role was assigned to the policy departments of the 
ministry. The background of this shift is a clear distinc-
tion between policy and construction/maintenance. 
In daily practice, there remains a narrow cooperation 
between the policy departments of the ministry and the 
Rijkswaterstaat as the executive agency of the ministry.
The separation of policy making and policy 
implementation led to intensive discussions of how 
the Rijkswaterstaat should be related to the ministry. 
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Finally, the decision has been made to transform the 
organization of the Rijkswaterstaat into an agency 
(Agentschap), through which the organization came to 
be positioned at a greater distance from the Ministry.7 
In the period 2004–2008, the organization changed 
significantly under the leadership of the general-
director, Bert Keijts. The Rijkswaterstaat developed 
into the executive organization of the ministry with 
three main tasks: the management of the main roads, 
the management of the main waterways, and the inte-
grated management of the main water systems. The 
organization was modernized by introducing a new 
business model. First, a high priority was given to a 
transparent financial system, through which expendi-
tures can be controlled and justified and budget over-
runs can be avoided. Furthermore, the organization 
developed itself to a public-oriented network organi-
zation with a focus on the users of those networks—
the complicated systems of main roads, main water-
ways, and main water systems. The construction of 
large infrastructure works remains an important task 
of the new Rijkswaterstaat. Much attention has been 
given to internalize this “public-oriented network 
management” in the minds and working methods of 
the Rijkswaterstaat employees.8 At the same time, the 
challenge was to do more with fewer employees. In the 
period 1980–1994, the number of employees decreased 
from 13,700 to 9,700.9 This number went up again in 
the subsequent years. The period 2003–2008 showed a 
comparable decrease: from 11,300 to 9,300.10 
Another important organizational change came 
from the national discussion within the Dutch govern-
ment on the organization of applied scientific research 
in the Netherlands. On the basis of the Report of the 
Commission Wijffels, scientific knowledge was concen-
trated in a few renowned institutes, the so-called Large 
Technological Institutes (Dutch abbreviation: GTIs).11 
These GTIs are centers of technological expertise for 
companies and the government. For knowledge of 
water management, the institute Deltares was founded 
in 2007. In this organization, WL/Delft Hydraulics, 
Geodelft, parts of TNO-Bouw, and large parts of the 
research services of the Rijkswaterstaat were concen-
trated. At the Rijkswaterstaat these research services 
changed from knowledge institutes to institutes “exter-
nally organizing knowledge,” and they developed exper-
tise for advising the networks managed by the Rijks-
waterstaat. Repeatedly, the discussion arises as to how 
much knowledge the Rijkswaterstaat must have within 
its own organization to fulfill its new role. From 2007 
to 2013, the Water Service (Waterdienst) has fulfilled 
this task within the Rijkswaterstaat. Since 2013, the 
Service for Water, Traffic and the Environment (Water, 
Verkeer en Leefomgeving) has been performing this task. 
An important task of the Rijkswaterstaat is to provide 
information about the water system. This effort is now 
concentrated in the Water Management Centre in the 
Netherlands (WMCN), which provides daily information 
for users of the Dutch water systems, including water 
levels, river discharges, flood risks, water quality, and 
so on.12 This information is obtained from the National 
Water Monitoring Network (Landelijk Meetmet).
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ERA
In the 1960s and early 1970s, environmental awareness 
started to grow in the Western world (as discussed in 
chapter 6). One of the most influential publications at 
that time was the Limits to Growth report of the Club of 
Rome (1972). This report clearly demonstrated the limits 
to exploiting the earth’s natural resources by a rapidly 
increasing population.13 At that time people began to 
learn about the unintended consequences of the rapid 
economic growth and industrialization after World 
War II. This new perception of the limits to economic 
prosperity was further strengthened by the oil crisis of 
1973. The change of societal mood was reinforced by the 
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activities of an environmental movement that was at first 
rather fragmented, but increasingly became better coor-
dinated and more influential.
The 1950s and 1960s had been glorious decades 
for the Rijkswaterstaat. Both the budgets available for 
public works and the number of large infrastructure 
projects (most notably the construction of highways 
and the Delta Works) were at their height. The new envi-
ronmental movement, however, would be particularly 
successful in shaping new images of the large public 
works that were planned and designed by the Rijks-
waterstaat engineers.
The impact of environmentalism on the Rijkswater-
staat and Dutch water management was also strongly 
influenced by a second main societal development: 
the democratization of Dutch society. As in many other 
places around the world, the sixties and seventies were 
a politically dynamic period in the Netherlands. This 
was the time of protest marches against the war in 
Vietnam, student revolts, and the occupation of univer-
sities. Support for political parties that were based on 
religious affiliation declined rapidly. Gaining support 
were new political parties—such as the Social-Liberal 
party D66—aimed at a fundamental reform of the polit-
ical system. This democratization movement attacked 
all established institutions, including traditional 
political party structures, universities, and churches. 
Authority was less accepted and people demanded 
more openness and possibilities for influencing 
decision-making processes. Not surprisingly, the Rijks-
waterstaat came under attack in that turbulent period. 
Whereas the Rijkswaterstaat had always received credit 
for its expertise and contribution to the economic 
welfare of the country, in the seventies, the very same 
organization became heavily criticized for its lack of 
responsiveness to societal demands and environmental 
issues. Increasingly, the Rijkswaterstaat was labeled as 
a closed technocratic bulwark, with its road planning 
destroying nature because of an authoritarian and non-
responsive attitude that was out of touch with society.14
The organization of the Rijkswaterstaat clearly faced 
difficulties in responding to the new societal demands 
for openness and transparency and in incorporating new 
environmental values in its policies and working prac-
tices, but gradually it developed capacities for adapting 
to the new circumstances. This process was facilitated 
by the dynamics within the Rijkswaterstaat, induced by 
the march of new disciplines—ecologists and biologists 
particularly—into the ministry. This “new vanguard” 
managed to challenge the policies and working practices 
of the community of civil engineers that had dominated 
the organization of the Rijkswaterstaat until then.15 It is 
exactly the combination of the external (growth of envi-
ronmental awareness, democratization of society) and 
internal pressures (a new vanguard) that accounts for 
the “ecological turn” in Dutch water management.16 In 
spite of important value conflicts, such as safety versus 
ecology or economy versus ecology, the expertise and 
concepts of the ecologists were incorporated by the 
traditional corps of engineers rather smoothly. Some 
quantifiable concepts of ecology could be integrated into 
decision-support systems and assessment tools.17
Besides the impact of the environmentalists and 
the democratization of Dutch society, the economic 
decline after the second oil crisis (1980–1982) put the 
Rijks waterstaat under pressure. The budgets for the real-
ization of public works and the number of employees 
were reduced substantially after the seventies. Later 
on, this process was reinforced by the global spread of 
the neo-liberal ideology. This ideology favored market 
deregulation and promoted the role of the private 
sector. It was best articulated by Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher (in Thatcher’s “there is no alterna-
tive”) and would influence policies of the successive 
Dutch governments since that time. Liberalization and 
the tools of New Public Management became quite 
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popular during this period. Contracting-out and public-
private partnerships became increasingly accepted 
instruments in Dutch water management. Next to these 
ideological motives, more substantive changes in water 
resources management triggered reorganizations of 
the Rijks waterstaat as well. After the completion of the 
Delta Works, the Delta Service became superfluous 
and was dismantled. Until 1984 water quantity and 
quality management were organized separately. With 
the recently developed concept of integrated water 
resources management, these tasks were combined, and 
a new organizational distinction between fresh and tidal 
water was made (National Institute for Inland Waters 
and National Institute for Coastal and Marine Waters).
Shortly after the celebration of the 200 years of the 
Rijkswaterstaat, the organization came under fire again. 
The costs of several large infrastructure projects—most 
notably the Betuwe Route (Betuwelijn), a new railroad 
to Germany—exceeded the planned budgets. Even 
though cost overruns were mainly due to a long list of 
modifications proposed by local politicians and pressure 
groups to mitigate negative impacts on the landscape 
and those living near the railroad, the organization of 
the Rijkswaterstaat was often blamed for it in the media. 
Moreover, several cases of corruption in the Netherlands 
in which a few employees of the Rijkswaterstaat were 
involved attracted media and political attention. Under 
pressure from Minister of Finance Gerrit Zalm, and the 
leadership of the Minister of Transport, Public Works 
and Water Management Karla Peijs, the organization of 
the Rijkswaterstaat was fundamentally reorganized by 
a substantial reduction of the number of civil servants 
and by the introduction of a sharp distinction between 
the policy-making task of the ministry and the imple-
mentation task of the Rijkswaterstaat, which was given 
the status of an agency. Recent accounts of the reorga-
nization process by Van den Brink and Metze show that 
the main objectives of the reorganization (reducing the 
number of civil servants and a more public-oriented 
way of working) have been achieved, but some new 
problems were introduced.18 Where Metze points to the 
drawbacks of the loss of expertise, which makes it more 
difficult to critically supervise projects that are being 
implemented by market parties, Van den Brink mainly 
points to the difficulties employees of the Rijkswater-
staat face when they participate in regional planning 
projects.19 Since the Rijkswaterstaat was given the status 
of an implementation agency, its representatives in the 
region are not allowed to make any policy-sensitive 
decision without consulting the policy directorate in The 
Hague. Such problems, however, are not unique to the 
Rijkswaterstaat organization, as they are faced by any 
organization undergoing a similar transformation.
These developments in Dutch water management 
are illustrated by the controversies over three major 
infrastructure projects: the enclosure of the Eastern 
Scheldt; the reclamation of the Zuiderzee polder, the 
Markerwaard; and the strengthening of the dikes along 
the main rivers. It will be shown how the waves of envi-
ronmentalism and democratization have influenced 
Dutch national water policies since the early seventies.
Decision making on the storm surge barrier in the 
Eastern Scheldt is often considered a major turning 
point in the history of Dutch water resources manage-
ment.20 In the past, coastal engineering projects had 
been aimed at flood protection and at serving economic 
interests, but, in the decision-making process on the 
enclosure of the Eastern Scheldt, environmental issues 
were seriously addressed for the first time. During the 
implementation of the Delta Plan most other tidal 
branches in the southwestern Netherlands had been 
closed off, and their valuable estuarine ecosystems were 
destroyed. Because of the influence of the environ-
mental movement and the shift in public opinion, social 
and political attention to potential ecological damage 
increased during the construction of the Delta Works.
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In 1967 the Rijkswaterstaat Delta Department 
started developing plans for the enclosure of the widest 
estuary, the Eastern Scheldt. This estuary had a very rich 
biodiversity and the sandbars were favorite feeding spots 
for birds. The estuary also had an important shellfishery. 
According to the engineers working at the Delta Depart-
ment, a fixed dam would be the only possible option for 
realizing safety, but a coalition of environmentalists and 
fishermen argued that strengthening the dikes along 
the estuary would be a much better alternative. Various 
accounts of the Eastern Scheldt crisis demonstrate that 
the Delta Department faced difficulties in incorporating 
the new environmental values into policy alternatives, 
and stuck to the proposal for a fixed dam.21 Only after 
the installation of the cabinet under Prime Minister 
Joop Den Uyl, the most leftist cabinet in Dutch history, 
did the coalition of environmentalists gain access to 
the decision-making forums on the highest level, and 
the Dutch cabinet started to put pressure on the Rijks-
waterstaat engineers to develop a solution that would 
take into account the environmental issues raised. 
This is a clear example of the primacy of politics. It is 
only due to a change of government that the change of 
Eastern Scheldt policies became possible. The ministers 
of the new social-liberal party D66, in particular, played 
a crucial role in this. These political changes, however, 
reflected the change in public opinion: many perceived 
the Rijkswaterstaat as an organization that had no eye 
for environmental or ecological issues. 
An expert committee designed alternatives to 
the closure and concluded in its report that an open 
storm surge barrier was technically feasible. The Rijks-
waterstaat had to further develop this alternative into 
a new design that would meet safety standards as well 
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as ecological standards. Doing so required a radically 
innovative concept, which the Delta Department devel-
oped in cooperation with the involved contractors, a 
consultant, and the assistance of various knowledge 
institutes. They managed to design a half-open storm 
surge barrier on piers. The core idea of this construction 
was that the barrier can be closed during storm surges, 
and left open under normal weather conditions, thus 
maintaining estuarine dynamics. 
Decision making concentrated on three policy alter-
natives: the construction of a fixed dam, the strength-
ening of dikes along the estuary, and the construction of 
a semi-permeable dam. The Rijkswaterstaat contracted 
with the RAND Corporation for comparing these alter-
natives. The POLANO-study (Dutch acronym for Policy 
Analysis for the Eastern Scheldt) was an interesting 
innovation in Dutch water policy analysis, because 
this study included a wide range of possible criteria, 
including the potential impact on the environment and 
ecology. Part of the environmental research carried out 
for this study was supported by a newly created envi-
ronmental section of the Delta Department headed 
by the first university-educated biologist to work for 
the Rijkswaterstaat, H. L. F. Saeijs.22 The Dutch Cabinet 
opted for the construction of a storm surge barrier in 
1976, and the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier was 
completed in 1986, at a total cost of 2.5 billion euros 
(more than the cost of all other Delta Works combined). 
Numerous innovations were developed during the 
construction process: a special ship was constructed 
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to transport the pillars and a machine was designed 
to place huge mattresses to stabilize the pillars. Today 
the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier is generally 
perceived as one of the main achievements in coastal 
engineering in the world. It served as a test-bed for 
ecological design, integrated project planning, and 
stakeholder analysis and communications strategies. 
As such, it marked a new era in water management and 
in the Rijkswaterstaat’s position: the project enabled 
the Rijkswaterstaat to repair the rift with society and to 
partly restore its prestige.23 In spite of the impressive 
engineering achievement, and the innovative concept 
of a storm surge barrier with movable gates, it is now 
clear that the barrier still has had an enormous impact 
on the Eastern Scheldt ecosystem, because the tidal 
volume—and hence estuarine dynamics—has dimin-
ished substantially. The reduced tidal volume flowing 
through the storm surge barrier has caused the estuary 
sand bars to begin to shrink, threatening the bird 
feeding spots, and new protective measures had to be 
Construction ship Ostrea lifts a pillar into position
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undertaken. In the other closed estuaries in the south-
western part of the Netherlands, mineral emissions 
from farms caused severe water pollution, and here, 
also, additional projects were undertaken to improve 
the ecological quality, such as an inlet sluice to refresh 
the stagnant water in the Veere Lake.
A second model project illustrating the environ-
mental era in Dutch water management is the recla-
mation of the Markerwaard, a polder in the Zuiderzee 
(IJssel Lake). Where decision making on the Eastern 
Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier is generally considered to 
be a turning point in the implementation of the Delta 
Works, decision making on the Markerwaard can be 
considered a similar turning point in the implementa-
tion of the Zuiderzee works.24
As described in chapter 6, the Afsluitdijk (1932) had 
reduced flood risks along the IJssel Lake considerably 
and made possible various land reclamation projects. 
After the successful reclamation of the Northeast Polder 
(Noordoostpolder), which includes the former islands 
of Schokland and Urk, the Eastern (1957) and Southern 
(1968) Flevopolders were reclaimed. Unlike the north-
east polder, the Flevopolders were designed as an artifi-
cial island with a narrow lake between the mainland and 
the new polder. This lake was created to maintain access 
to the sea for certain towns on the mainland and to be 
able to better manage the water tables. 
The next reclamation project planned was the 
Markerwaard. There are many reasons why the Mark-
erwaard polder has never been created. First and fore-
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most, it is important to know 
that the food self-sufficiency 
doctrine, which was the 
main trigger for creating the 
other polders, was no longer 
adhered to after the establish-
ment in 1957 of the European 
Economic Community, prede-
cessor of the EU. In addition, 
unlike the reclamation of the 
older polders, the reclama-
tion of the Markerwaard was 
planned in an era character-
ized by distrust of the Rijks-
waterstaat. A broad coalition of 
actors opposed to a new land 
reclamation project in the IJssel 
Lake successfully challenged 
the various arguments put 
forth by the government. They 
pointed, for example, to the 
loss of a valuable fresh water 
ecosystem, an argument that 
had never played a role in deci-
sion making on reclamation 
projects until then. The oppo-
sition also successfully chal-
lenged the various economic 
arguments for creating another 
polder in the Zuiderzee. In 
1972 a new decision-making 
procedure for large-scale spatial 
and infrastructure projects was introduced: the Spatial 
Key Decision (Planologische kernbeslissing, or PKB). This 
procedure allowed for the participation of a wide range 
of actors in decision making on the Markerwaard. In 
addition to the end of the food self-sufficiency doctrine, 
the democratization of decision making and the recogni-
tion of new (environmental and landscape) values may 
explain why decision making on the reclamation of the 
Markerwaard has been postponed time and again. 
Environmentalism and the democratization of 
Dutch society also influenced decision making on the 
improvement of dikes along the main rivers. The river 
Rally against the Markerwaard polder project, 1979
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levee strengthening 
program had made 
virtually no progress 
until the 1970s because 
the Delta Works and 
sea dike strengthening 
projects took such a 
large share of the allo-
cated budgets. In the 
1970s, the water boards 
finally sped up the levee 
strengthening schemes. 
By then, however, they 
faced staunch opposi-
tion from conservationist 
action groups who feared 
the destruction of the 
idyllic river landscape 
and doubted the neces-
sity of the strengthening 
program. Because of 
the value conflicts and 
the ample opportunities 
opponents had to delay the realization of planned dike 
improvement projects, the Rijkswaterstaat and the 
water boards were practically unable to meet the legally 
defined safety standards and to guarantee safety along 
the main rivers. Only after the floods of 1993 and 1995 
were they able to realize these safety standards.
The developments described above also had an 
impact on the broader national water policies, which 
were formulated in a series of policy documents on 
water management. The first national policy docu-
ment on water management, issued in 1968, mainly 
addressed water quantity issues and the economic 
functions of water, such as water use by households 
and industry, agricultural water use, and navigation.25 
Environmental issues were not completely ignored—in 
the 1940s, the Rijkswaterstaat director-general, Ludolf 
Reinier Wentholt, addressed the problem of salt intru-
sion, and in the 1950s water quality became a major 
issue. Salt intrusion worsened, as did chemical pollu-
tion, also because of increasing effluents in the Rhine 
and Meuse basins. The pollution had detrimental 
effects on the quality of drinking water, since large 
parts of the Dutch Randstad, the urbanized western 
part of the Netherlands, use Meuse water as a source 
for drinking water production.
In 1970, after years of preparation, a water pollution 
act passed Parliament (Wet Verontreiniging Oppervlakte-
wateren, WVO). The Rijkswaterstaat was assigned the 
legal task of implementing this water pollution act on 
the main rivers and lakes, and the provinces had to set 
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up provincial water quality programs. The WVO intro-
duced a permit system for emissions and a system of 
fines for violators based on the “polluter pays” principle. 
Also under the WVO, wastewater purification stations, 
already developed before 1940, were built on a massive 
scale. The WVO is often called a prime international 
example of successful environmental legislation.26 
The second national report on water manage-
ment, issued in 1984, broadened the scope of national 
water policies by more systematically addressing water 
quality and ecological issues. This was made possible 
by the PAWN-study (Policy Analysis for Water manage-
ment in the Netherlands), which, like the POLANO-
study for the Eastern Scheldt, was a new type of policy 
analysis introduced in the Netherlands by the RAND 
Corporation.27 Together with the Rijkswaterstaat and 
Delft Hydraulics, RAND developed computer models 
that were able to calculate the impact that various 
water management alternatives would have on specific 
interests, such as agriculture, navigation, drinking 
water production, or nature itself. The PAWN-study has 
been particularly helpful in showing the various inter-
relationships within a water system and the interde-
pendencies between water users. 
Building on the highly influential document 
“Living with Water” (1985), to which Rijkswaterstaat 
biologist H. L. F. Saeijs contributed, the third water 
management policy document of 1989 introduced the 
concepts of a water systems approach and of integrated 
water resources management.28 Water was conceived 
as an integrated system of subsystems (surface water, 
groundwater) and functions (transport, drinking 
water, ecological functions, recreation, etc.) and 
water management required an integrated approach, 
balancing these functions, and linking water manage-
ment, spatial planning, and nature development.29 This 
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concept was implemented by the Rijkswaterstaat for 
the main rivers and lakes and by the provinces and the 
water boards for the regional waters. The 1992 Water 
Boards Act assigned to the water boards—in addition 
to flood management and water quantity manage-
ment—water quality management.30 This act strength-
ened the position of the water boards within the Dutch 
state organization. The position of the water boards was 
further strengthened by the ongoing mergers between 
water boards. There are currently only twenty-four 
water boards, many of which cross provincial borders. 
Although the provinces still play a role in coordinating 
water policies with spatial and environmental plan-
ning, their position in the water sector has weakened 
considerably over the past few decades. 
The fourth water management policy document 
was released along with the influential document 
“Water Management in the 21st Century.” These docu-
ments were issued in the aftermath of the floods on 
the main Dutch rivers that occurred in 1993 and 1995 
and the water troubles in 1998 stemming from intense 
precipitation. Both of these documents emphasized 
the urgent need for better coordination between water 
management and land-use planning.31 After a few 
decades in which environmental and ecological issues 
had gained a prominent place in the political agenda, at 
the turn of the century water safety issues again started 
to dominate the Dutch water agenda.
In December 2009 the Dutch Cabinet adopted the 
National Water Plan, which contains the national water 
policies for the period 2009–2015. The new national 
water policy emphasizes the need for climate-proofing 
the Netherlands and for implementing the Room for the 
River and Delta programs.32
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RENEWED CONCERN FOR FLOOD SAFETY 
The 1970s showed a continued discussion on the flood 
safety standards along the major rivers in the Nether-
lands. This period marked the aftermath of the Report 
of the Delta Commission (1960), which advised the 
Dutch government on the safety standards after the 
flood disaster of 1953.33 However, these new safety levels 
would result in significantly increasing the height of 
the dikes along the river. Much opposition arose within 
society because of its impact on the landscape. There-
fore, the Dutch government installed the Becht Commis-
sion in 1975 to evaluate the new safety standards. In 
1977 the Becht Commission advised on an exceed-
ance frequency of 1:1,250 years at a river discharge of 
16,500 cubic meters per second for the Rhine River at 
Lobith.34 This advice was accepted by the government 
in 1978. However, continuous protest against the dike 
reinforcements forced the government to install a new 
commission in 1992: the Boertien Commission. In 1993 
the Boertien Commission concluded that a safety level 
of 1:1,250 years was required, but advised, on the basis 
of a new statistical analysis, to reduce the representa-
tive river discharge to 15,000 cubic meters per second.35 
The commission advised also taking into account the 
so-called LNC-values (landscape, nature, and culture) 
and involving citizens and municipalities more in the 
decision-making process. 
However, shortly after the presentation of the 
report of the commission, the floods of 1993 and 1995 
demonstrated that the existing dikes could barely 
resist the floods with an exceedance frequency of 1:100 
years. In 1995 the situation was extremely critical, and 
about 250,000 inhabitants in a Gelderland riparian 
zone were evacuated within two days. This situation 
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made clear that dike reinforcement programs had to be 
implemented with high priority and in a short period 
of time. On February 13, 1995, the government—after 
negotiating agreements with representatives of the 
provinces, water boards and the Dutch municipali-
ties—presented the Delta Plan Major Rivers.36 Within 
one month of the flood of 1995, the emergency law Delta 
Law Major Rivers, prepared by the Legal Department of 
the Headquarters of the Rijkswaterstaat, was accepted 
by the Dutch Parliament. Under this law, procedures 
could be passed or shortened, and the dikes could be 
given the required height and strength in 1995 and 1996. 
According to this law, dikes in areas of a lower urgency 
had to be completed before 2001.37 
In the River Meuse, extreme floods occurred in 
1993. In December 1993 the river discharge reached a 
maximum of 3,120 cubic meters per second, resulting 
in large inundations and much damage. Therefore, in 
January 1994 the Boertien Commission II was installed 
with the task of advising the government on the protec-
tion of the River Meuse against such extreme floods. 
The commission presented their report on December 
12, 1994.38 It laid out three possible strategies: building 
of levees together with deepening of the summer bed 
of the river; building of levees together with deepening 
of the summer bed and nature development; and 
building of levees. The commission advised to deepen 
the summer bed combined with a limited amount of 
environmental development and to build levees only 
for specific areas where other measures are shown to be 
insufficient. However, in the beginning of 1995 a flood 
occurred again. Although the maximum Meuse river 
discharge was lower (2,870 cubic meters per second), in 
the more downstream areas it had more severe effects 
because of the longer duration of the flood wave.39 
Under societal pressure, the government decided to start 
with building the levees to guarantee a protection with 
an exceedance frequency of 1:50 years. Under the Delta 
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Law Major Rivers (Deltawet Grote Rivieren), these works 
had already been completed in 1996 and 1997. The next 
step was to realize a safety level of 1:250 years, which 
was the mandate of the project De Maaswerken (Meuse 
Works), and had to be realized at the latest in 2005. For 
budgetary reasons, this date shifted to 2015, under the 
condition that seventy to eighty percent of the agreed 
safety level would be realized by 2005.40 
The safety standards are legally confirmed in the 
Flood Defense Act (Wet op de Waterkering). This law 
was first introduced in Parliament in 1989, agreements 
were obtained in 1994, and it came into force in 1996. 
Because of the critical flood risk situations in 1993 and 
1995, a number of amendments were applied.41 The 
safety standards for the coastal areas were in agreement 
with the proposals of the Delta Commission (1960). For 
the embanked rivers Rhine and Meuse a safety standard 
of 1:1,250 years was declared for the upstream parts of 
these rivers and 1:2,000 years for the downstream parts. 
Every five years the safety standards are to be evalu-
ated, through which an updated insight is obtained of 
the natural pressures (water levels, wave attack, river 
discharge). This occurs for each of the fifty-three dike 
ring areas. In 2005 the forty-two dike ring areas along the 
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upstream part of the Meuse also came under this law, 
with a safety standard of 1:250 years. In 2009 the Flood 
Defense Act was incorporated in the Dutch Water Act, in 
which a number of existing water acts were integrated, 
thus creating a framework for the modernization of 
Dutch water management.42 
On the basis of the five-year evaluation, in 2001 
the representative river discharges associated with the 
agreed safety levels changed from 15,000 to 16,000 cubic 
meters per second for the Rhine and from 3,650 to 3,800 
cubic meters per second for the Meuse.43 In 2006, these 
safety levels remained unchanged.44 For the longer term, 
reconnaissance studies were carried out, for both the 
Rhine and the Meuse.45 The objective was to investigate 
the possibility of guaranteeing the same safety levels in 
the twenty-first century under the influence of climate 
change and expected soil subsidence. The representa-
tive river discharges, for which these safety levels must 
be reached, were 18,000 cubic meters per second for the 
Rhine and 4,600 cubic meters per second for the Meuse.
In fact, all these agreements were reached as a 
consequence of the implementation of the recommen-
dations of the Delta Commission in the 1950s and its 
1960 report. The recommendations and report resulted 
in the Delta Plan, shortening the coastline by more than 
600 kilometers through blocking the estuary mouths of 
the Haringvliet (Haringvliet Dam, 1971), the Grevelingen 
(Brouwers Dam, 1971) and the Eastern Scheldt (Storm 
Surge Barrier, 1986). The estuary mouths of the New 
Waterway and the Western Scheldt were to remain open 
because of the shipping routes to the ports of Rotterdam 
and Antwerp. The height of the dikes along these water-
ways must be raised to the “Delta level.” Around 1980 
it was discovered that the dikes in the Rotterdam area 
were too low to fulfill the determined level of protec-
tion. Although they have been raised significantly after 
World War II, they should be raised by at least 1.60m.46 
However, it was difficult to make these dikes higher, as 
they were situated in a very densely populated area, 
involving high costs and having a visual impact on old 
town centers, some with a history of several centu-
ries. Moreover, the duration of the construction was 
an important factor, because the reinforcement of the 
dikes in this area was expected to take more than thirty 
years. Therefore, there was pressure to find alternatives, 
particularly a moveable barrier that could be closed 
under exceptional circumstances, occurring once in ten 
years. An important requirement of the barrier was that 
it would not block the shipping route.47 
The choice was made for two large floating gates 
on either side of the New Waterway that would move to 
each other to close the waterway. The construction of 
the barrier started in 1991, and on May 10, 1997, after six 
years of construction, Queen Beatrix opened the Maeslant 
Barrier. The barrier was designed with two “circle 
segments,” each with a length of 210 meters and a height 
of 22 meters. Each gate rotates around a ball joint with a 
diameter of 10 meters and a weight of 680 tons. Closing 
and opening of the barrier is driven by a self-operating 
computer system, which is linked to meteorological, 
river discharge, and sea level data. When a storm surge 
of three meters above normal sea level is anticipated in 
Rotterdam, the barrier will be closed automatically. The 
complexity of the closure process requires that deci-
sion making be completely automated. To achieve the 
required level of reliability, a double computing system 
has been installed; during extreme situations the system 
is continuously monitored by a team of experts. Well 
before the actual closing procedures are started, incoming 
and outgoing ships are warned, and two hours before 
closure shipping is prohibited. The barrier is designed 
to withstand a storm situation that is expected to occur 
once in 10,000 years. It is expected that closing the barrier 
is needed, on average, once in ten years. 48 On November 
8, 2007, the Maeslant Barrier was closed for the first time 
since its construction because of a strong storm surge. 
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In 1999 the secretary of state for transport, public 
works and water management and the president of 
the Union of Water Boards established the Advisory 
Committee on Water Management in the 21st Century 
(WB21). The committee was charged with developing 
recommendations for desirable changes to the water 
management policy in the Netherlands, focusing on the 
consequences of other water-related problems, such as 
climate change, rising sea level, and land subsidence. In 
2001 guidelines were produced for future water manage-
ment. The Dutch government enacted these guidelines 
in a new approach to ensure safety and to reduce other 
water-related problems in the twenty-first century. This 
approach includes, among other things:
• Awareness: citizens should be more aware of prob-
lems associated with water
• Three-step-strategy: retaining, storing, discharging
• Room for the river: more land for occasional storage 
is required
• Spatial planning: prevent non-river-related human 
activities in the floodplains
• International cooperation: must be intensified.49
The new approach requires land use changes and 
introduces new scientific research issues and has an 
impact on the working methods of the responsible water 
resources agencies. Increased attention is also being 
given to communication and public participation.
In 2000 the Room for the River concept was adopted 
as a government policy. Through this concept the 
Dutch government initiated a shift from “traditional” 
flood protection policies (i.e., raising the dikes) towards 
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than thirty projects were formulated and a variety of 
measures were developed to implement this policy, such 
as levee relocation, the construction of bypasses and 
spillways, and locations for water storage. The main goal 
is a reduction of high water levels; other goals are nature 
development and landscape restoration. The develop-
ment and implementation of these new river policies 
required intensive cooperation among water managers, 
spatial planners, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), and inhabitants of the areas along the main 
rivers. For that reason, the Dutch national government 
decided to organize the decision-making process on the 
new Room for the River policies not as a centralistic top-
down process in which the Dutch national government 
would decide autonomously on the most effective policy 
program. Instead, the national government demanded 
that the provinces issue regional guidance on desir-
able measures to create more room for the river. The 
provinces were asked to prepare this guidance in close 
cooperation with the affected municipalities and water 
boards, and to involve a wide range of NGOs, including 
agricultural organizations, agencies serving the interest 
of recreation, representatives of river-related industries, 
and environmental groups. 
Two main policy objectives or conditions were 
formulated beforehand. First, the final policy program 
proposed by the Dutch provinces would have to guar-
antee safety for the approximately four million inhabit-
ants of the areas along the main rivers. Safety standards 
were defined, which would have to be reached within 
both the short term (2015) and the long term (2050). 
Second, it was decided to improve the “spatial quality” 
A secondary channel, parallel to the main channel in the Waal River, intended to spur nature 
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of the river landscape at the same time—for example, 
considering possibilities to create new nature preserves 
or for the development of new sites for urban expan-
sion along newly created river branches. Because of 
the relatively open policy process, parties have been 
able to combine different perspectives and to develop 
multi-purpose plans that are acceptable to most of them. 
The Room for the River project, therefore, is not only a 
substantive policy innovation, but is generally considered 
to be an interesting innovation in governance as well.50 
The Room for the River concept has also had an 
international resonance. During the flood of 1995, the 
ministers of land use planning had their regular meeting 
in Arles. In the communication of this meeting the 
ministers of the riparian states declared that further 
measures had to be taken to reduce future river flood 
risks. They supported an integrated approach: not only 
water management, but also land use/spatial plan-
ning had to be taken in account, leading to river basin 
management. In 1998 Highwater Action Programs were 
created on the basis of the Arles Declaration.51
To be prepared for record-level river discharges—
discharges higher than those related to the agreed 
safety standards—the Luteijn Commission was 
installed in April 2001 to advise on the possibilities of 
“controlled flooding.” Although such a catastrophic 
situation is not expected, a significant reduction of 
damage and number of casualties is expected when 
the surplus water is guided to areas with low popula-
tion densities and relatively low economic investments. 
In their report of 2002, the commission presented the 
results of their investigations to look for possibilities 
of emergency inundation areas along the Rhine and 
Meuse rivers.52 Ultimately, they focused on three areas: 
the Rijnstrangen and the Ooijpolder along the Rhine 
and Beersche Overlaat along the Meuse. The cabinet 
was intrigued by the recommendations of the commis-
sion and announced in July 2002 that a final decision 
would follow in the coming years. However, local 
opposition arose in the potential emergency inunda-
tion areas, particularly in the Ooijpolder, because 
the people and the local political representatives had 
the feeling that their land would be sacrificed to the 
benefit of more-downstream areas. Moreover, memo-
ries of the evacuations in 1995 were still alive. Amidst 
all this political turmoil and the scientific debates on 
uncertainties with respect to the real flood reduction 
impact of emergency inundation areas, the govern-
ment decided in 2005 that the use of Ooijpolder and 
Rijnstrangen would not be cost-effective and that 
those areas would not be used for controlled flooding. 
In extreme flood stage, therefore, these areas will be 
particularly vulnerable. The situation illustrates the 
gap between policy and politics.53 It may be expected 
that this political discussion will return when proposals 
are presented for further differentiation of the safety 
standards, based on new insights of the flooding risks 
within the Netherlands as a result of the newest find-
ings of societal cost/benefit analyses. In the National 
Water Plan, which came into force in December 2009, 
it was decided by the Dutch government to also give up 
the reservation of the Beersche Overlaat as an area for 
controlled flooding in emergency situations.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, an 
American flood event and a former American politician 
have contributed much to placing the issue of water safety 
high on the Dutch political agenda again. The devastating 
Hurricane Katrina raised social and political awareness 
of the risks involved in occupying low-lying delta areas in 
the Netherlands. Furthermore, Al Gore’s film An Incon-
venient Truth, and his related visits to the Netherlands, 
which received a great deal of media attention, contrib-
uted much to societal awareness of the seriousness of 
climate change and the vulnerability of the Netherlands. 
In September 2007 the Dutch government installed 
the new Delta Commission, which was responsible 
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for giving advice on how to protect the Netherlands 
against floods for the longer term (specifically to 2100 
and generally to 2200). This question was asked in the 
light of climate change (rising sea level and higher 
peak discharges of the rivers) and developments within 
society (demographic shifts and increased investments). 
In September 2008 the new Delta Commission presented 
its report to the Dutch Parliament. It was concluded 
that sea level is probably rising faster than was previ-
ously projected, and extreme variations in river flow are 
expected to increase. It was advised that the flood protec-
tion levels of all diked areas must be improved by a factor 
of ten, and that all measures to increase the protection 
levels must be implemented before 2050. At the moment 
there is no serious problem, but the need for being well 
prepared was strongly emphasized.54
An important recommendation of the commis-
sion was that a Delta Act should be implemented. This 
act was discussed in the cabinet in October 2009 and 
submitted to the Lower House in the spring of 2010. 
The Delta Act forms the legal basis for a Delta Program, 
in which measures and provisions for water safety and 
fresh water supply are developed, including their plan-
ning and estimates of their costs. A Delta commissioner 
is charged with drawing up, updating, and imple-
menting this program on behalf of the cabinet. A minis-
terial steering group under the authority of the minister 
of transport, public works and water management 
includes representatives from the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, the Ministry 
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance. 
To finance all the measures and provisions for 
water safety and freshwater supply, a Delta Fund was 
proposed. The fund is expected to include the expen-
diture of the state on the construction, improvement, 
management, maintenance, and operation of water 
management structures with a view to water safety 
and freshwater supply—and the related water quality 
management. The budget will be allocated annually to 
the Delta Fund from the general resources. The costs for 
the implementation of the proposed Delta Program were 
estimated by the commission at 1.2 to 1.6 billion euros 
per year in the period 2010–2050 and 0.9 to 1.5 billion 
per year in the period 2050–2100.
The Delta Program comprises nine sub-programs, 
three of which are general (safety, freshwater, and 
new spatial developments and reconstructions) and 
six are directed to specific regions (Rhine estuary 
mouth, Southwestern delta, IJsselmeer region, rivers, 
coasts, and Wadden Sea region). The Delta Program 
commissioner is responsible for ensuring that the Delta 
Program is realized. 
Proposals for a new system of safety standards 
against flooding and their differentiation will be 
prepared in the safety sub-program. Cost-benefit 
analyses have been made based upon the present situ-
ation and combined with assessments of individual risk 
of death as a result of flooding and group risk (the risk 
of large numbers of casualties). The new standards are 
scheduled to be incorporated into the Water Act. Obvi-
ously, this fundamental decision will be of great impor-
tance for the outcome of the regional sub-programs. 
Whereas Dutch water safety policies had almost 
exclusively focused on reducing flood probability 
(either by constructing dikes or creating room for the 
river), floodplain occupancy and the increasing invest-
ments made behind the dikes have made it necessary 
to develop policies aimed at reducing flood exposure 
and flood vulnerability as well. Therefore, a three-step 
approach was chosen: giving additional emphasis to 
prevention, paying attention to risk reduction through 
sustainable spatial planning, and developing sound 
evacuation plans.55 In this new approach to flood 
management, prevention remains the highest priority, 
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and its safety levels will not be reduced by secondary 
risk-reducing measures or provisions. It is expected that 
the Delta Program will have a profound impact on flood 
defense policies in the Netherlands for the years to come. 
At least as important as the flood management 
along the rivers is the defense of the country against the 
attacks from the North Sea. Therefore, coastal defense 
has a high priority in the Netherlands. The coast itself 
consists of about 290 kilometers of natural dunes and 
60 kilometers of dikes and dams. In the 1970s and 1980s 
attention focused on the realization of the Delta Works. 
The Storm Surge Barrier in the Eastern Scheldt and the 
Maeslant Barrier in the New Waterway also reflected 
an emphasis on coastal defense. For the coast itself 
the Rijkswaterstaat was invited by the government to 
prepare a strategy for the years after 1990. The document 
“First Coastal Report” (Eerste Kustnota) (1990) made a 
plea for “dynamic preservation,” for which strategic and 
operational objectives have been defined. The strategic 
objective was to guarantee a sustainable safety level and 
sustainable preservation of values and functions in the 
dune area. The operational objective was to maintain 
the coastline at its 1990 position, for which an ongoing 
coastal nourishment policy has been developed. 
As a standard of reference, the so-called Basal Coast 
Line (BCL) has been defined as the estimated position 
of the coastline on January 1st of 1990. This position has 
been derived from an extrapolation of the linear trend 
of coastline positions during the years 1980–1989. The 
choice for a ten-year linear extrapolation is based on 
being not dependent on incidental erosions.56 The oper-
ational objective is to maintain the Momentary Coast-
line (MCL) not landward of the BCL. The MCL is calcu-
lated from data of the Dutch yearly coastal monitoring 
program, which has been operational since 1963. In the 
coastal documents that followed, a plea has been made 
for sand replenishment at deeper water (1993) and to 
look for a stronger relation between coastal safety and 
spatial planning (1995). The expected effects of climate 
change became of increasing importance in making a 
new water safety policy. A lot of uncertainty is acknowl-
edged. In the water policy document “National Water 
Plan” (Nationaal Waterplan) (2009) the sea level rise of 
0.15 to 0.35 meters is expected for the period 2000–2050 
and 0.35 to 0.85 meters for the period 2000–2100.57 The 
sand replenishment strategy offers the advantage that 
the amount of replenished sand can be adjusted easily 
when the sea level rise is higher or lower than expected. 
The role of the state is extensive: overall supervision, 
flood defense management at the Wadden Isles and at 
the Delta Dams, and coastline management. As overall 
supervisor, the state also bears responsibility for stra-
tegic policy. Daily management of flood defenses of the 
sandy Holland and Delta coast is the task of the water 
boards. For implementation of coastline management, 
such as the design of annual management schemes, the 
state seeks advice from provinces, water boards, and 
municipalities. Since 2002 the water policy and inter-
national coordination is the responsibility of the Water 
Directorate at the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, whereas the Rijkswaterstaat is responsible 
for the design, construction, management, and mainte-
nance of the main infrastructure facilities. 
Toward the end of the first decade of this century 
an innovative project started in the Dutch coastal zone 
called “Sand Motor” or “Sand Engine” (Zandmotor).58 
The Rijkswaterstaat, the Province of South Holland, 
universities, research institutes, and the private sector 
started experiments by depositing large amounts of 
sand at a specific location near the coast and allowing 
the natural elements such as wind, waves, tides, and 
currents to work. As a consequence, a kind of manmade 
peninsula was formed along the coast, which subse-
quently contributed to the formation of new beaches 
and dunes. The purpose is the enhancement of coastal 
protection in the long term, by widening beaches and 
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dunes for natural and recreational use, and especially 
reducing the need for beach replenishment. Much 
attention is given to the monitoring of the sand move-
ments. Knowledge development, thanks to the Sand 
Motor project, is co-financed by the European Union’s 
Regional Development Fund. Between March and 
October 2011, 21.5 million cubic meters of new sand 
were deposited in the coastal zone. The “Sand Motor 
Monitoring and Evaluation” program of this project is 
organized by the Rijkswaterstaat. The first official results 
will be published in 2016.
EUROPEANIZATION OF WATER POLICIES
BORDER-CROSSING RIVERS
The Netherlands is located in the delta of four interna-
tional rivers: the Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt, and Ems, of 
which the Rhine is the largest. The largest portion of 
these basins is situated in other European countries. 
Therefore, international cooperation, mutual adjust-
ment, and joint decision making are of utmost impor-
tance, and transboundary river commissions have a 
long and rich history. 
The Rhine River is one of the longest and most 
important rivers in Europe, at about 1,230 kilome-
ters in length and an average discharge of more than 
2,000 cubic meters per second. It is Europe’s busiest 
waterway, linking the Swiss Alps to the North Sea, 
flowing through Switzerland, Germany, France, and 
the Netherlands. Its basin includes major European 
industrial areas, such as the Ruhr region in Germany 
and the Rijnmond region in the Netherlands. The Port of 
Rotterdam—“The Gateway to Europe,” at the mouth of 
the Rhine—is the largest harbor in Europe. 
There is a particularly rich history of cooperation 
on the Rhine River. Major progress has been achieved 
The Sand Motor (or Sand Engine) is a huge volume of sand that was deposited along the coast of Zuid-Holland 
at Ter Heijde in 2011. Forces of nature will spread the sand along the shore, thereby reinforcing the coastline 























8   Environmentalism, Flood Safety, and Europeanization of Policy
following wars, other manmade and natural disasters, 
and more recently European Union interventions. 
Cooperation started in the field of navigation in 1815, 
just after the Napoleonic Wars, with the creation of 
the Central Commission for the Rhine Navigation (see 
chapter 2). The river authorities of the Rhine states 
succeeded in eliminating obstacles that impeded navi-
gation, which contributed considerably to trade and 
industry in this part of Europe. 
The end of World War II marked the beginning of a 
new chapter in the Rhine’s history. Although pollution 
from chlorides gained attention at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, awareness of this problem has grown 
rapidly since then. Industrial and urban leaders came to 
realize that they could not continue to dump untreated 
effluents into the river and still expect it to provide their 
freshwater needs, and governments realized that the river 
was no longer capable of fulfilling its multiple functions. 
On July 11, 1950, upon the initiative of the Netherlands, 
the riparian countries of the Rhine downstream of Lake 
Constance—Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Germany, 
and The Netherlands—joined forces by establishing the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine 
(ICPR). During the first decade of the ICPR, it served as 
a common forum for discussing questions and seeking 
solutions relating to pollution in the Rhine. However, in 
1963 the ICPR parties concluded that the existing tools for 
cooperation among the governments should be strength-
ened. Therefore, on April 29, 1963, they formalized ICPR’s 
existence by signing the Convention on the Protection 
of the Rhine, which widely became known as the Bern 
Convention. The Bern Convention gave the commission 
the authority to hold annual plenary sessions and draft 
international treaties. In 1972 the commission was given 
the additional task of organizing regular ministerial-level 
meetings. These Rhine Ministers’ Conferences remain the 
single most important forum for handling issues of Rhine 
pollution and ecology.59 
The first Rhine Ministers’ Conference on the 
pollution of the Rhine was held in 1972 to recom-
mend further actions to reduce pollutant chemicals. 
In 1976 the Rhine Ministers drafted two important 
conventions. The first treaty, the 1976 Bonn Conven-
tion Concerning the Protection of the Rhine against 
Pollution by Chlorides, focused on waste salts from 
industrial production (mostly potash fertilizers). The 
second, the Bonn Convention for the Protection of the 
Rhine, addresses all chemical inputs into the river, both 
those from “point sources” and those from “non-point 
sources.” In fulfillment of the Chloride Convention, 
the bulk of the discharge reductions fell on the potash 
industry in the Alsace region in France. The conven-
tion obligated France to construct chloride-removal 
systems at their potash plants and to pump the recov-
ered salts into underground limestone formations. 
However, due to protests in the Alsace region, the 
French government refused to submit the Chlorides 
Convention to Parliament for ratification. In 1985, 
after finding methods for storing the waste salts more 
securely, the French ratified the Chlorides Convention. 
Since then the river’s salt load has dropped signifi-
cantly. Although the convention required a strong 
reduction of the inputs from France, it was financed 
largely by the other basin states (Switzerland 6 percent, 
Germany 30 percent and the Netherlands 34 percent). 
The official argument was that the other countries 
must also reduce their inputs, but in reality the French 
potassium mines were the main contributor. However, 
it was viewed as a concession to France to come to an 
agreement. The Chemicals Convention was initially on 
a faster track but also ran into implementation prob-
lems of its own. One of the causes was the lack of suit-
able technologies for reducing the input of many of the 
chemicals. Treatment plants often took years to design 
and construct, especially if the mitigation technologies 
were new or untested. 
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International cooperation got a new impetus on 
November 1, 1986, when a fire broke out in a chemical 
storehouse by Sandoz in Basel, Switzerland. It was 
extinguished with large amounts of water which then 
streamed into the Rhine, heavily polluting the water 
with pesticides and degradation products. The water in 
all downstream countries became polluted. Drinking 
water companies had to stop their intake of water, 
massive fish kills occurred, and some speculated that 
the Rhine ecosystem was virtually dead. The ecosystem 
was restored relatively quickly after the chemicals 
disappeared, however, because of renewal from tribu-
taries. Nonetheless, the accident had a large impact. 
Within two weeks, a Rhine Ministers Conference was 
organized, and in May 1987 a concept Rhine Action 
Plan (RAP) was ready, which included as central goals 
the return of salmon to the Rhine and a 50 percent 
reduction of emissions for many substances.60 The RAP 
was helpful in implementing the Chemicals Conven-
tion, putting many of the chemicals in the Chemicals 
Convention on a fast track for reduction and targeting 
every factory on the Rhine, regardless of size, that 
produced any testable amount of organic and inorganic 
substances on the priority list. Improvements in water 
quality between 1970 and 2000 demonstrate unequivo-
cally that both the Chemicals Convention and the Rhine 
Action Plan have had an enormously positive impact on 
the entire Rhine basin. 
A part of the 1987 Rhine Action Plan was the Plan 
Salmon 2000, which aimed to establish self-sustaining 
populations of Rhine salmon by the first decade of 
the new millennium. This plan was directed to all of 
the river’s main migratory fish (salmon, sea trout, sea 
lamprey, and sturgeon), but the spotlight was on the 
salmon as a key indicator of the river’s health. It also 
has a greater symbolic value than other migratory 
fish in this river. Many hindrances in the river were 
removed or made passable, so that these fishes could 
migrate between the upper river and the North Sea. 
Examples are changes in the operation procedures of the 
Haringvlietdam in the mouth of the Meuse-Rhine Delta 
and modifications at the sluiceways in the Afsluitdijk 
between the IJsselmeer and the Wadden Sea/North Sea. 
However, it was not until the Rhine Protection Commis-
sion issued its blueprint for riparian restoration, the 
Ecological Master Plan for the Rhine (1989), that salmon 
repopulation commenced.61 
In January 1998 the 12th Conference of Rhine 
Ministers adopted an Action Plan on Flood Defense to 
be implemented over twenty years. The floods of 1993 
and 1995 were catalyzing events for this plan. The most 
important aims of the plan were to reduce damage by up 
to 10 percent by the year 2005 and by up to 25 percent by 
2020. Extreme flood levels downstream of the regulated 
Upper Rhine are to be reduced by up to 30 centimeters 
by 2005 and by up to 70 centimeters by 2020. These 
ambitious targets are likely to be reached only through 
an integrated managerial approach at local, national, 
regional, and international levels. 
The Rhine Action Plan on Flood Defense empowered 
the Rhine Protection Commission to “compensate for 
the ecological deficits of the past” by removing “human 
Poisoned fish in the Rhine due to the Sandoz 
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interferences with the river regime as far as possible.” The 
plan is conceived in phases. The first phase (1995–2000) 
was directed to provide a comprehensive overview of 
flood-prone regions in the Rhine catchment basin. This 
task was largely accomplished with the publication of 
the Rhine Atlas in 1998, which identifies polder areas 
and maps sites where a return to natural conditions is 
economically feasible and ecologically necessary.62 The 
second phase (2000–2005) focused primarily on the 
establishment of water storage sites. The goal is to reduce 
the maximum water height under extreme conditions by 
30 centimeters. The aim of the third phase (2005–2020) 
is a reduction of 70 centimeters of the maximum water 
level for protecting the downstream areas.
Because the 1987 Rhine Action Plan ended in the 
year 2000, the 13th Conference of Rhine Ministers on 
January 29, 2001, adopted the new program, Rhine 
2020: Program for the Sustainable Development of 
the Rhine. The Rhine 2020 program focused on the 
continued implementation of the Ecological Master 
Plan for the Rhine (1991), the improvement of flood 
prevention by implementing the Action Plan of Floods 
(1998), and the further improvement of water quality 
and groundwater protection. Summarizing, the targets 
of the Rhine 2020 program are:
• Sustainable development of the Rhine ecosystem
• Secure the use of Rhine water for drinking water 
production
• Improve sediment quality in order to be able to 
dispose of dredged material without causing any 
harm
• Comprehensive flood protection and protection 
taking into account ecological requirements
• Depollution of the North Sea.63
During the 14th Conference of Rhine Ministers held 
on October 18, 2007, the ministers, together with the 
representative of the European Commission, made 
an assessment of the many years of cooperation in 
protecting the Rhine, its tributaries, and the entire water-
shed. Above all, they recommended a further reduction 
of inputs of pollutants, particularly nitrogen inputs of 
diffuse origin, such as agriculture and micro-pollutions 
from urban wastewater. They also made agreements for 
the upstream migration of fish into the Rhine system via 
the floodgates of the Haringvliet and the construction of 
a fish passage at the Strasbourg Barrage and decided to 
work on an “overall strategy for the sediment manage-
ment of the Rhine.” Special attention was given to jointly 
developing adaptation strategies for water management 
in the Rhine watershed in order to be able to cope with 
the challenges of climate change. In this way they actual-
ized the guidelines for future cooperation.
Sixty years of cooperation on the Rhine by a 
succession of Rhine Conventions and Conferences of 
Rhine Ministers, and the implementation of numerous 
measures, resulted in immense improvement of the 
water quality of the Rhine and along many of its tribu-
taries. Also, the biological state of the Rhine and its 
tributaries improved substantially and the species 
numbers continued to rise. Since 2006 migratory fish 
may again reach the spawning grounds in the Rhine 
tributaries as far as Strasbourg. Great efforts were made 
towards improving flood prevention and protection, 
but also a large number of measures have yet to be 
implemented. A continued monitoring and updating of 
the Action Plans is foreseen. In particular, the effects of 
climate change have garnered a great deal of attention. 
Increasingly this cooperation is organized on the scale 
of the entire international river basin. 
The Rhine 2020 program is increasingly carried 
out in direct relation to the European Water Directives, 
particularly the EU Water Framework Directive (2000). 
These European developments will be discussed further. 
Comparable developments occurred in the other major 
river basins (Meuse, Scheldt, and Ems), but the Rhine 
River has primary consideration. 
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EUROPEAN WATER POLICY
The history of Europe has been characterized much 
more by divisions, tensions, and conflicts than by 
any common purpose. Rivalry between the states, 
emerging and declining empires, such as the Roman 
Empire (27 BC–476 AD), the Frankish Empire (third–
tenth century), the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867–
1918), the Ottoman Empire (1293–1922) and so on, are 
the “ever repeating” picture in the European history. 
European history is therefore shaped by a long list of 
conflicts: wars between and within European nations 
as well as rebellions by groups seeking independence. 
Examples include the Eighty Years’ War (1568–1648), 
the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), and the Napoleonic 
Wars (1799–1815). Political, religious, and economic 
deviations and differences in language form the basis 
of these conflicts. The twentieth century showed 
dramatic explosions in the rivalry between the Euro-
pean powers, resulting in World War I (1914–1918) and 
World War II (1939–1945). 
After the Second World War the political climate 
favored the unification of Europe. The European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded in 1951 by 
the Treaty of Paris. The founding members of the ECSC 
were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and West Germany. In 1957 two new communities 
were established: the European Economic Community 
(EEC), founded by the Treaty of Rome, and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) by yet another 
Treaty of Rome. These three together were generally 
known as the European Community (EC). On this basis 
the European Union (EU) was introduced by the Treaty 
of Maastricht and came into force on November 1, 1993.64 
Currently (2013) the EU is composed of 28 indepen-
dent sovereign states, which are known as the Member 
States (MS). Discussions on joining the EU are going on 
with some “candidate countries” (Iceland, Montenegro, 
Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
and Turkey). To join the EU, a country must meet the 
Copenhagen Criteria, defined at the 1993 Copenhagen 
European Council. These criteria require a stable democ-
racy which respects human rights and the rule of law, 
a functioning market economy capable of competition 
within the EU, and the acceptance of the obligations of 
the membership, including EU law.65 
The European Community started its environmental 
policies with an ambitious program that contained 
many elements of today’s ideas on “sustainable devel-
opment.”66 After the first United Nations Conference 
on the Environment in Stockholm 1972 and growing 
public and scientific concerns on the limits to growth, 
the commission became active in initiating an original 
community policy. On the basis of European council 
commitments in 1972 to establish a community envi-
ronmental policy, the first Environment Action Program 
(EAP) was decided upon in November 1972. It was 
argued that “the protection of the environment belongs 
to the essential tasks of the Community.” The next EAPs 
have become gradually broader in their scope, reflecting 
the cross-border nature of many environmental issues as 
well as the development of the single market, where the 
freedom of movement of people, goods, services, and 
capital is guaranteed by a standardized system of laws 
for all Member States. The sixth EAP (2002–2012) focuses 
on four priority areas: climate change, nature and 
bio diversity, environment and health, and sustainable 
use of natural resources and the management of wastes. 
Its strategy now is to postpone potentially controversial 
political decisions to later phases and to rely on more 
cooperative approaches. The role of small specialist 
expert communities increased and the commission 
changed its key role from an initiator of legislation to a 
manager of policy processes. 
Water legislation was one of the first sectors to be 
covered by the EU environmental policy. Since the begin-
ning of the 1970s water protection has been a subject of 
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rising concern. It developed in a number of steps. The 
first period (1973–1988) mainly focused on the protection 
of water used for human activities. Environmental quality 
standards (EQS) were specified in a number of direc-
tives. Examples are the Surface Water Directive in 1975, 
the Dangerous Substances Directive of 1976, and the 
Drinking Water Directive in 1980. This period included 
quality objectives legislation on fish waters, shellfish 
waters, bathing waters, and groundwater. 
The period 1991–1998 focused more on limitations 
of particular emissions, both from point sources and 
diffuse sources. The eutrophication of waters, caused 
by an abundance of nitrates and phosphates, received 
particular attention. One of the biggest problems that 
future water protection is facing is not insufficient legis-
lation, but the fact that basically no directive has been 
completely implemented and applied by the Member 
States. Central to this are the high public costs involved. 
For example, the EU-wide costs for the implementation 
of the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive were 
estimated to be 150 billion euros (1994–1995 value) 
during the period of 1993–2005. However, this direc-
tive was relatively well implemented. Greater problems 
arose with the implementation of the Nitrate Directive, 
which created problems in most European countries. 
The reduction of diffuse pollution and required changes 
in agricultural production are much more difficult to 
achieve than the control of the easily identifiable sources 
of urban waste water pollution. 
Pressure for a fundamental rethinking of commu-
nity water policy came to a head in mid-1995. The 
commission, which had already been considering 
the need for a more global approach to water policy, 
accepted requests from the European Parliament’s 
Environmental Committee and from the Council of 
Environmental Ministers. The commission agreed to 
produce a framework for water policy and, if appro-
priate, devise a legislative proposal to ensure the overall 
consistency of water policy. The draft legislation of this 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) was circulated in 
1996, with amendments processed in 1997 and 1998. 
The final text was adopted in October 2000, and the WFD 
came into force in December 2000. The directive’s over-
riding requirement is that the Member States ensure that 
a “good chemical status” and a “good ecological status” 
are achieved in all European waters by the end of 2015. 
Its aims are a higher quality of aquatic ecosystems and 
their environment, a sustainable use of water resources, 
and an improvement of the aquatic environment by 
reducing pollution and mitigating the impact of floods 
and droughts. To implement these objectives, river 
basin management plans have to be outlined for every 
international river basin. In the Netherlands four river 
basins have been defined: The Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt, 
and Ems. The Water Framework Directive marked a new 
stage in the harmonization and internalization of inte-
grated water management policy. Its implementation 
also implied a more intensive network-building of all 
relevant water management actors. 
Although the WFD aspires to an integrated water 
management approach, flood management issues 
are not covered by the WFD. However, pushed by the 
extreme summer floods in 2002, the commission made a 
proposal for a Floods Directive, Reducing the Risks of 
Floods in Europe, which was adopted in 2007 and came 
into force in December 2007. The objective of the Floods 
Directive is to create obligations for Member States to 
manage the risks of floods to people, property, and the 
environment by concerted, coordinated action at river 
basin level and in coastal zones. Such provisions should 
be undertaken by all European countries in their River 
Basin Management Plans. In the coming years, a further 
integration may be expected of the ecological WFD with 
the EU Floods Directive to an integrated water resources 
management approach under the EU Common Imple-
mentation Strategy (CIS).67 
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Dutch River Basins 
The four rivers entering the Netherlands: Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt, and Ems. Lower left, the 
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Notwithstanding large differences among the 
various European countries, such as differences in 
geography, physical conditions, culture, institutional 
organization, and politics, this strategy successfully 
arrived at a coherent and harmonious implementation 
in accordance with the agreed-upon time scales. The key 
element is the River Basin Management Plan (RBMP) 
that Member States have to produce for each river basin 
management district. The preparation of RBMPs is an 
important area of influence for all stakeholders, because 
this is where all relevant issues for the achievement of 
the WFD objectives are negotiated. Part of this plan is the 
program of measures (PoM), which should be indicated 
for all waters at risk, to achieve the objectives of Article 4 
of the WFD in good time. The DPSIR-approach (Driver-
Pressure-State-Impact-Response), a causal framework 
for describing the interactions between society and the 
environment, is used as a logically stepwise approach 
of driving forces (land use, industry, agriculture, etc.), 
human pressures, the “state” of the environment, the 
environmental effects, and the societal response through 
physical measures, regulations, taxes, and so on. The 
legally binding timetable with its strict deadlines and 
powerful sanctions is expected to be a valuable instru-
ment to reach the agreed targets in good time. 
In almost all European countries the introduction of 
the WFD has placed a great deal of pressure on existing 
institutions. The WFD provides procedural rules and 
guidelines for organization, planning, and management 
at the river basin scale. Kallis and Briassoulis (2004) 
indicate how the WFD recognizes the limits of the top-
down “command and control” approach and adopts a 
more flexible and cooperative implementation strategy.68 
EU working groups, with participation from national 
delegates, experts, and representatives of NGOs, are 
preparing nonbinding guidance on the various imple-
mentation-related tasks, such as the identification of 
water bodies, reference conditions, environmental 
objectives, public participation, and monitoring.
The new European dimension of water manage-
ment has induced changes in water management 
practices in the Netherlands. In fact, it is working with 
a number of new “rules of play.”69 The Netherlands has 
experience of many centuries in the protection of the 
country against extreme floods. During the past several 
decades, water quality, nature conservancy, and land-
scape ecology received increasing attention, and since 
the 1980s integrated water management has become 
a widely accepted practice. The Water Framework 
Directive builds on this by focusing on the ecological 
status of the water bodies. Furthermore, the catch-
ment approach forms the basis for the European water 
management, and this has no long history in the Neth-
erlands because it is situated in a delta and the basins 
of all major rivers are largely situated outside the 
country. Furthermore, in the Netherlands the commit-
ments of the water agencies were generally based on 
agreements to work on the realization of jointly agreed 
high ambitions. Now commitments must be made on 
measurable contracted results. No large differences in 
the final results are expected, but the loss of flexibility 
should be accepted and the agreed ambitions need to 
be attuned to the new situation. 
Also for the Rijkswaterstaat, this European context 
and its “new rules of play” implies a change in its 
working practice. It has the responsibility for the 
management of the major rivers, which means that it 
concentrates on the river management between the 
dikes. However, working with the catchment approach 
means close coordination with a number of stake-
holders, including the water boards and the provinces. 
It was difficult to see these major rivers as a part of 
the whole catchment, in which jointly-agreed visions, 
objectives, and measures must be defined and agree-
ments must be reached about their real implementa-
tion. This was all the more difficult because of the 
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transition from a set of rather independent regional 
divisions of the Rijkswaterstaat to a more centrally 
governed organization, where priorities must be made 
between investments in different river basins. It often 
resulted in tensions in the decision-making process 
in sub-basins at the regional level. Setting priorities at 
the national level requires the balancing of priorities of 
one river basin over another. The question then arises 
how joint agreements can be made with regional repre-
sentatives of organizations in the river basin, in which 
decisions are taken at a higher (national) level. Never-
theless, these problems have been solved pragmati-
cally during the cooperation of all concerned water 
authorities in the more than 130 regional working 
groups, in which joint proposals have been developed 
for objectives, measures, and actions to arrive at a posi-
tive status of all water bodies in such an area. In this 
way, all contributed to the jointly agreed River Basin 
Management Plans, which were sent to the European 
Commission in March 2010. 
Not surprisingly, this European cooperation was 
not restricted to the border crossing rivers and their 
catchments; also the North Sea has a long international 
history. In the North Sea a huge number of functions 
have to be fulfilled, such as shipping, fishing, recre-
ation, oil and gas production, sand and gravel extrac-
tion, energy production by wind turbines, pipeline 
transport, and so on. The challenge is to combine such 
a large number of functions with a sustainable main-
tenance of ecological values. Doing so had become a 
major concern for the Directorate for the North Sea 
of the Rijkswaterstaat as well. This directorate, since 
its establishment in 1971, has been responsible for 
the maintenance of navigation channels to the ports 
of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, for the management 
of navigation on the North Sea, and for a monitoring 
network that produces data for weather forecasts, 
prediction of storm surges, and other purposes.70 The 
directorate became increasingly involved in the imple-
mentation and enforcement of international environ-
mental agreements and regulations and the Sea Water 
Pollution act (Wet Verontreiniging Zeewater).71 
Two important milestones in the 1970s are the Oslo 
Convention and The Paris Convention. A particular 
event gave rise to these agreements for protection of the 
sea area. On July 16, 1971, the Dutch ship Stella Maris 
was sailing from the port of Rotterdam to dump chlo-
rinated waste in the North Sea. Under pressure from 
public opinion and the governments of several coun-
tries, the ship returned to the port without carrying out 
her mission. On February 15, 1972, in Oslo agreement 
was reached on the Convention for the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 
(the “Oslo Convention”). The agreement came into 
force in 1978. It was felt that such an agreement must 
not be restricted to marine pollution by dumping but 
should also prevent marine pollution from discharges 
of dangerous substances from land-based sources, so 
a Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
from Land-Based Sources (the Paris Convention) was 
signed on May 4, 1974, in Paris and came into force in 
1978. Two commissions were established to administer 
these conventions: the Oslo Commission and the Paris 
Commission. In a joint meeting of the commissions in 
1992 in Paris, which was attended by the ministers of all 
concerned states and a representative of the European 
Union, a new convention was adopted for the Protection 
of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(the OSPAR Convention), together with a Final Decla-
ration and an Action Plan to guide the future work of 
the OSPAR Commission, in which the Oslo and Paris 
Commissions were united. The OSPAR Convention 
came into force in 1998. Its activities concentrate on four 
main areas: protection and conservation of ecosystems 
and biological diversity, hazardous substances, radioac-
tive substances, and eutrophication. Important steps 
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forward have been made by the international North Sea 
Ministers Conferences, which started in 1984 in Bremen. 
An example of such an important step is the adoption 
of the precautionary principle at the London Confer-
ence in 1987. Until 1995, pollution was the main issue. 
Since then, increasing attention was given to the North 
Sea fish stocks and the impact of fisheries on the North 
Sea ecosystem. Starting from an ecosystem approach, 
a framework of operative ecological quality objectives 
(EcoQOs) has been established. 
In June 2008 the European Commission adopted 
an ambitious Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
(MSFD) to protect more effectively the marine environ-
ment across Europe.72 It aims to achieve “Good Envi-
ronmental Status” (GES) of the EU’s marine waters by 
2020. On September 1, 2010, the European Commission 
adopted a set of detailed criteria and indicators. Major 
research topics were defined to develop additional 
scientific understanding for assessing this GES, which 
include the effects of climate change, the impact of 
human activities, the ecosystem approach to research 
management and spatial planning, and a further devel-
opment of operational oceanography and marine tech-
nology. Both through this MSFD and the OSPAR-agree-
ments, intensive cooperation has developed between 
the countries around the North Sea. The Netherlands 
is represented by the Rijkswaterstaat as the adminis-
trator of the Dutch part of the North Sea area. At the 
strategic level, the Rijks waterstaat was the leading actor, 
but since 2002, the Water Directorate of the Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management (now 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment) has 
assumed this leading role. 
CONCLUSION
As described in chapter 6, the period 1900–1970 was a 
technocratic era, where the required budgets were avail-
able and civil engineers had the mandate to design their 
solutions for water problems within society. This situ-
ation changed radically since the 1970s. The economic 
decline forced the Rijkswaterstaat to work with lower 
budgets and a severe reduction in the number of 
employees. From 1980 to 1994 the number of employees 
was reduced from 13,700 to 9,700. At the same time, the 
increased environmental awareness, through which 
water systems are now seen as important ecosystems, as 
well as the unfolding democratization of Dutch society, 
had an enormous impact on water management. Water 
management problems could only be solved by an 
integrated approach, where hydraulic, environmental, 
economic, and social aspects were combined, and 
collaboration with stakeholders and the public has 
become key to solving many water problems.
The organization of the Rijkswaterstaat clearly 
had difficulties in responding to the new challenges. 
Discussions on large infrastructure projects led to 
severe criticism of the organization of the Rijkswater-
staat, notably the cost overruns of the Betuwe railroad 
route to Germany. Although other factors contributed 
to exceeding the project budget, the organization of 
the Rijkswaterstaat was often blamed in the media. 
The technocratic approach and not listening to other 
viewpoints sparked criticism as well. In regard to water 
management, this is illustrated by the Eastern Scheldt 
project and the Markerwaard reclamation project.
Particularly the Eastern Scheldt project, but also 
other discussions in the same period, contributed to a 
turning point in the organization and working methods 
of the Rijkswaterstaat, although this was generally a 
gradual development process. A number of painful reor-
ganizations were needed. During the period 1970–2010 
the Rijkswaterstaat developed into a multidisciplinary 
organization and attempted to become more oriented 
to the public. Over the past 200 years the Rijkswaterstaat 
has proved to be a resilient organization, knowing how 
to adapt and to survive.
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Notwithstanding all the criticism, impressive results 
were achieved during this period, including a number 
of innovative technological projects, new methodolo-
gies, and advanced water management policies. The 
organization also managed to realize these changes in 
complex political and societal circumstances. An essen-
tial difference with the past is that implementation of 
new policies and the realization of projects are increas-
ingly accomplished with other actors, such as the prov-
inces, water boards, and private enterprises. Examples 
include the implementation of the Water Pollution 
Act (WVO), the construction of the Eastern Scheldt 
Barrier, the development and implementation of inte-
grated water policies in the 1970s and 1980s, and the 
River Management Plans in the 1990s after the floods 
of 1993 and 1995, resulting in the large infrastructure 
projects Room for the River and Meuse Works. In addi-
tion, the Flood Defense Act of 1989 and the emergency 
Delta Law Major Rivers of 1995 were implemented in 
cooperation with the provinces and water boards. The 
coastal zone benefited equally from such achievements, 
such as the new policies for “dynamic preservation” of 
the coastline in the 1990s and the application of inno-
vative sand replenishment technologies to guarantee 
a sustainable safety level and to preserve values and 
functions in the dune area. Finally, important contribu-
tions were made to the international coordination for 
the Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt, and Ems rivers, resulting, for 
example, in Rhine Action Plans and Meuse Action Plans 
and their implementation. 
In addition to the “ecological turn” and “societal turn” 
at the end of the twentieth century, the beginning of the 
twenty-first century witnessed an “organizational turn” in 
2002, as policymaking and international cooperation were 
transferred to the policy department of the ministry. After 
that, the Rijkswaterstaat underwent an intensive reorga-
nization process, resulting in a public-oriented network 
organization. Also impressive is the “knowledge turn” in 
2007, when a large number of Rijkswaterstaat specialists 
switched to the knowledge institute Deltares.
 Notwithstanding all these “turns,” there is also a 
great deal of continuity. The basic institutional struc-
ture of water management within the Netherlands has 
hardly changed. The new Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment, the Rijkswaterstaat, provinces, 
and water boards are still the crucial governmental 
actors in Dutch water management, and unlike many 
other countries, water management and water safety 
continue to be the exclusive responsibility of these 
governmental actors. Finally, in spite of the broadened 
arsenal of flood management strategies, the construc-
tion and strengthening of dikes remain the dominant 
safety strategy to date. 
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